{"id":930718,"url":"http://info.mzalendo.com/api/v0.1/hansard/entries/930718/?format=json","text_counter":50,"type":"other","speaker_name":"","speaker_title":"","speaker":null,"content":"A reading of Article 113 of the Constitution reveals its terminal nature on a Bill, whose passage requires both Houses, and what has been referred to in Australia as “deadlock clause”. Indeed, this provision exposes legislation to a potentially limitless mediation cycle that sounds a death knell to any Bill whose bicameral consideration results in a disagreement between the Houses on certain provisions therein. Whereas this would not be seriously injurious on ordinary Bills whose enactment may be delayed, up to and including being re-introduced in a succeeding Parliament, it is perilous to subject a critical Bill like the Division of Revenue Bill to a limitless cycle of disagreement between the Houses of Parliament. This constitutional anomaly needs to be addressed, particularly so with regards to the Division of Revenue Bill. Hon. Members"}