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{
    "id": 1020607,
    "url": "https://info.mzalendo.com/api/v0.1/hansard/entries/1020607/?format=api",
    "text_counter": 367,
    "type": "speech",
    "speaker_name": "Seme, ODM",
    "speaker_title": "Hon. (Dr.) James Nyikal",
    "speaker": {
        "id": 434,
        "legal_name": "James Nyikal",
        "slug": "james-nyikal"
    },
    "content": "look at what is happening in broad terms, companies abandon projects and when they do that, like in the case of Itare, they go and declare themselves bankrupt. They have been paid more money than they should have. In the process of monitoring, it was clear that these people were not performing well. The certificate they were being given for work done was getting smaller. Nobody looked at that. That is a management issue. Then there is variation of cost. We all know variation in any project should not be more than 25 per cent. Here we find variations, like in Badasa Dam, where we started with Kshs2.3billion, it went to Kshs3.3billion and eventually Kshs2.1 billion was the amount paid. That was at 56 per cent of the work done. Then you find payment in advance. How do you make payment in advance? You do not even have land, but you are already paying the contractor. These are all against the regulations. I looked at that in Karimenu Dam, Kshs4 billion was paid before work was started. At Thwake Dam, Kshs7 billion was paid in advance. Then you find projects have stalled, but payments are made. Look at Umaa Dam, the project was supposed to be Kshs824 million and then it stalled, but what was paid was Kshs1 billion, with 68 per cent of the work done. Then we come up with this proxy system of engineering, procuring, construction and funding, so that the same person is basically doing everything because we are getting people to fund our projects."
}