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{
    "id": 1451415,
    "url": "https://info.mzalendo.com/api/v0.1/hansard/entries/1451415/?format=api",
    "text_counter": 27,
    "type": "speech",
    "speaker_name": "Hon. Speaker",
    "speaker_title": "",
    "speaker": null,
    "content": "Hon. Members, a strict reading of Article 115 of the Constitution shows that no limitation is imposed on the nature of reservations or, indeed, the recommendations that the President ought to make on a Bill. Indeed, this is also reflected in the practice in other comparative jurisdictions. For instance, in the United States (US) Congress, the President, while referring a Bill back to the House, may either choose to provide general recommendations based on the reservations to the Bill or propose the actual text to be added to or deleted from specified parts of the Bill. Concerns were also raised whether the Finance Bill, 2024, having been referred back to the National Assembly, would become law due to effluxion of time on the basis of the provisions of Article 115 of the Constitution. For clarity, Article 115(6) of the Constitution states, and I quote: “115. (6) If the President does not assent to a Bill or refer it back within the period prescribed in clause (1), or assent to it under (5)(b), the Bill shall be taken to have been assented to on the expiry of that period.” For context, Article 115(1) of the Constitution provides that: “115. (1) Within fourteen days after receipt of a Bill, the President shall− (a) assent to the Bill; or, (b) refer the Bill back to Parliament for reconsideration by Parliament, noting any reservations that the President has concerning the Bill.” A clear reading of these provisions reveals that the fourteen-day period applies to the President’s action regarding assent or refusal to assent to a Bill. As soon as any of the actions contemplated under Article 115(1) is undertaken by the President within the timelines prescribed, the application of Article 115(6) ceases to apply. In this regard, I wish to reiterate that the Constitution ought not to be construed in a narrow or sophistic sense. The Constitution should be interpreted broadly and liberally in accordance with the guiding principles provided under Article 259(1) of the Constitution. Bearing this in mind, it becomes evident that the fourteen-day period specified in Article 115 is a timeline for the President’s action and not a date when the Bill automatically becomes law. Therefore, the concerns alluding to the possibility of the Finance Bill 2024 becoming law due to the effluxion of time were and still are unfounded and a miscomprehension of the provisions of the Constitution. This also explains why the House was not recalled from recess for Special Sittings. Hon. Members, now that the regular sittings of the House have resumed, I wish to state that Standing Order 154(2) requires the House to consider the President’s reservations within 21 days when the House next meets. Under normal circumstances, the House would have had 21 days from today within which to consider and dispense with the Memorandum. However, noting that the Memorandum had already been referred to the Departmental Committee on Finance and National Planning for consideration on 27th June 2024, I have been briefed that the Committee is yet to conclude its consideration and shall table a report to the House on or before Tuesday, 30th July 2024 – that is next week. Hon. Members, permit me at this point to remind the House of the Speaker’s Communication of 28th July 2015 concerning the consideration of the President’s reservations to a Bill and amendments thereto."
}