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{
    "id": 1483334,
    "url": "https://info.mzalendo.com/api/v0.1/hansard/entries/1483334/?format=api",
    "text_counter": 96,
    "type": "speech",
    "speaker_name": "The Speaker (",
    "speaker_title": "",
    "speaker": null,
    "content": "I note that the constitutional mandate to impeach a governor is assigned to the county assembly and the Senate. Article 181 of the Constitution provides the circumstances under which a governor may be removed from office. In line with the terms of Article 181(2) of the Constitution, Parliament duly enacted the County Governments Act, Cap. 265, which, at Section 33, sets out the procedure to be followed in proceedings for the proposed removal of a governor. Further, Standing Order No.80 of the Senate Standing Orders also provides for the procedure for removal of a governor from office. These provisions provide for strict timelines to be followed by the Senate in such proceedings. Constitutional and statutory timelines cannot be wished away by the issuance of ex parte orders as this would jeopardize the Senate’s constitutional and statutory obligations. Professor Kithure Kindiki, the then Deputy Speaker in the Senate, could not have put it better when, in a ruling that he delivered on 23rd October, 2019, he ruled, and I quote- “I respectfully, but firmly determine that beyond peradventure, courts of law cannot and shall not stop or attempt to prevent Parliament from undertaking its constitutional mandate. Neither can the Judiciary compel any action to be undertaken by Parliament. I rule that, any injunction interfering with the work of Parliament has no effect on Parliament in exercise of its constitutional functions. Such court orders have no effect on the National Assembly or the Senate, or any of their committees respectively. In the unlikely event of any such orders, Parliament and its committees shall proceed unabated, unfettered and unhindered, as may be directed by their respective Speaker of Parliament. The question of the effect, if any, of the court orders injuncting the Senate from conducting any business is well settled. In this respect, the determination on the question is the same regardless of the position advanced by the County Assembly. Whether or not there was, in fact, a court order in this matter does not matter. Nothing turns on it. The result is the same, which is that Parliament cannot be prevented from the discharge of its constitutional functions by deed of an order of the court. The second issue for determination is whether, as contended by the governor, the threshold of two-thirds required at the County Assembly was not met. Related to this question is whether this is a question of fact, necessitating evidence to be adduced as contended by the County Assembly, or a pure question of law, requiring to be determined before the proceedings can continue. In other words, is this a classical preliminary objection or not? This question is important because in virtually all impeachment proceedings before the Senate, preliminary objections have been raised and in no instance has the Senate terminated proceedings on the basis of a preliminary objection. Successive Speakers have ruled that a preliminary objection would be considered together with the evidence and determined on the merits of the matter. In truth, the findings have meant that the preliminary objections raised did not fit within the true character of a preliminary objection. The electronic version of the Senate Hansard Report is for information purposesonly. A certified version of this Report can be obtained from the Director, Hansard and AudioServices, Senate."
}