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"id": 1507480,
"url": "https://info.mzalendo.com/api/v0.1/hansard/entries/1507480/?format=api",
"text_counter": 235,
"type": "speech",
"speaker_name": "Funyula, ODM",
"speaker_title": "Hon. (Dr) Ojiambo Oundo",
"speaker": null,
"content": "I do not want to belabour the point on the various provisions as ably articulated by the Leader of the Majority Party, but allow me to make a few observations. Ordinarily, in any typical arrangement in any democracy, courts indirectly make laws. When a court invalidates any provision of the law, it behoves on Parliament to re-enact it to meet the ruling of the court, unless that ruling has been appealed against and has been set aside. That is what members of the public need to know. My colleagues need to bear that fact in their minds. That is one of the basic law courses one is taught at the university. That one of the processes of making laws is through the courts. That is the background upon which we are reviewing the Public Audit Act. This is in response to a court order that was issued and cited in the Memorandum of Objects and Reasons – the case between Transparency International (TI) versus the Attorney-General and the Auditor-General. I want to mention a few issues on the amendments that are done in Clause 2 on the interpretation. We are creating the Office of the Auditor-General. An independent Office of the Auditor-General is being incorporated in accordance with Article 253 of the Constitution. Chapter 15 of the Constitution mentions several independent offices and constitutional commissions that ought to be body-corporates, like the Auditor-General. We are creating the Office of the Auditor-General to be distinct from the Auditor-General as set out in the Constitution. In essence, we are literally enhancing the powers and authority of that office. This is more than a mere constitutional office. It will be a body corporate, capable of suing and being sued, holding assets and related issues. Therefore, a decision must be drawn here. It is only the Auditor-General who is appointed under Article 229 of the Constitution who can append a signature on audit reports. It is important to draw such decision so that we have no issues at all. Clause 8, which seeks to amend Section 11(b) by inserting Section 1A, is superfluous. I hope the Leader of the Majority Party is listening so that when we get to the Committee of the whole House, this amendment does not go through. The appointing authority of the Auditor-General is the President with the approval of Parliament. Section 1A reads: “(1A) Where the term of the office of the Auditor-General is due to expire, the Auditor-General shall notify the appointing authority in writing of the contemplated vacancy, three months prior to the expiry of the term.” The import of this provision is that the appointing authority cannot remember the day they appointed and when the term of eight years will come to an end. That means delegation of duty by the person who is supposed to do those administrative chores for the President, whom we passed a Bill to be the Head of Public Service. I find this superfluous and unnecessary. What are we telling the people of Kenya? What happens if the Auditor-General himself does not notify the appointing authority? Are there any sanctions or penalties? I hope time allows so that we can drop this amendment. This is because the President, who is the appointing authority, ought to have records. Part of his duties is to have a checklist for every month or year. Clause 19 purports to amend Section 14 of the Act. Again, this is duplication of Clause 6, which already provides for development of an organisational structure and self- establishment for the Office of the Auditor-General. What I find fairly interesting, and I do not know what was the thought of the drafters, is the question of the appointment of the Deputy Auditor-General. We know that the Office of the Auditor-General is a constitutional office. The moment we make it a body corporate, it ceases to be an individual. The only constitutional mandate that the Auditor-General has is to sign audit reports. There will be conflict of interest with the Auditor-General appointing a deputy without due process. If that is the case, why not have the Auditor-General and the Deputy-Auditor General serve the same term, so that if the Auditor-General is leaving, the Deputy Auditor-General leaves at the same time? Their term should end together. What happens if the Auditor-General appoints a deputy two months before"
}