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{
    "id": 48620,
    "url": "https://info.mzalendo.com/api/v0.1/hansard/entries/48620/?format=api",
    "text_counter": 472,
    "type": "speech",
    "speaker_name": "Mr. Baiya",
    "speaker_title": "",
    "speaker": {
        "id": 8,
        "legal_name": "Peter Njoroge Baiya",
        "slug": "peter-baiya"
    },
    "content": "Mr. Temporary Deputy Speaker, Sir, thank you for giving me this opportunity to also contribute to this very important Bill. The Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission Bill is extremely critical, as far the country’s reform processes are concerned. This is really the cornerstone for ensuring political stability in this country. We are drawing from the past experience of the electoral fiasco of 2007. Even as we look at some of the proposals that are being made in this regard, we are, in my view, missing some of those very important lessons. To blame the commissioners for the fiasco of 2007 is an under-statement. It is misleading. It is Kenyans who failed. First and foremost, the political leaders failed. The Commission was a reflection of the political leadership and what it wanted. It is very convenient when trouble ensued for us to blame the commissioners. This is really a case of blaming the messenger. Mr. Temporary Deputy Speaker, Sir, I am very concerned that, if you look at what the Constitution says, we have gone to great length to emphasize that we require an independent commission. We have even set out the basic criteria that such an independent commission must meet, according to the Constitution. This is particularly with regard to Article 88(4). But when you look at this Bill itself, some of the provisions we are proposing – I am very shocked because I understand that some of these proposals were made by the Executive, I think by the Cabinet sub-committee – are very worrying. For example, Clause 5 talks about giving instructions to the Commission, and how it will relate to its Chief Executive Officer (CEO); I am telling you that is micromanaging the Commission. Let us get it right. The Constitution grants the mandate to handle elections in this country to the Commission. It also grants it the responsibility to exercise supervisory power. How can an Act of Parliament purport to tell them that you will exercise power to this extent and the other power will be exercised by the CEO? This is a CEO whom even this Parliament has not bothered to propose that we approve of. We want to approve the appointment of the Commission. I would urge the Minister to ensure that the responsibility for this is enhanced. We can even make provisions for penalties against the commissioners. The political leaders, having allowed the Commission to do the work, must give them space. For leaders to try to direct any CEO what to do has the danger of micromanagement. The other thing is that when we talk about part-time, executive and so on, those are all attempts to curb the independence of the Commission. It is really an attempt to deny them the power to exercise their constitutional mandate. I am surprised, because these are also the weaknesses which are likely to be exploited to help rig elections and mismanage them. Let Parliament be keen to grant responsibility and also the freedom to exercise that responsibility. I also want to talk a little about the secretary. I am not in any way denying that we have a problem with the Kriegler Report. The commissioners overstepped their limits. They did not possibly go to actual implementation. However, that was not all that was done wrongly. There were so many things that were done wrongly. If we are not committed to establishing an institution that will function fundamentally on a new slate of new constitutional principles, it will also fail. I am very certain that independent and competently appointed commissioners will actually discharge their responsibility and ensure professionalism, including that of the CEO. Mr. Temporary Deputy Speaker, Sir, the other issue I want to talk about concerns boundaries and the Ligale Report. The Constitution has again set out the basic criteria on how the proposed IEBC is to discharge its mandate. Once again, in the Bill we are also seeing an attempt to restrict that constitutional mandate. This should not be allowed. Indeed, these provisions in the Bill themselves are unconstitutional, and are liable to be challenged in a court of law as subverting the basic provisions of the Constitution. Even some of the recommendations in the Parliamentary Report certainly cannot override the provisions of the Constitution. The House was truly divided on this matter even as we put in the Report. We put it on record and commented that the Report itself was not without objections against it. Objections were raised, for instance, that some of the professional input from some of the experts, who were trying to inform the Ligale Report, namely Sakaja and Oduor, among others, had things which were conveniently disregarded. I also want to say that the controversy that the Ligale Report attracted had to do with vested interests. We know the way the distribution of those constituencies was done. We saw the influence of some powerful and vested interests. They influenced how the some of the constituencies were delineated. Are we telling the proposed Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission that it will take over some of those manifestly unfair and unconstitutional delimitations? That is what some of us are attempting to do. We are doing this while saying very strongly how we should uphold the Constitution. I think that is violating the Constitution while pretending to be upholding it."
}