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{
    "id": 560192,
    "url": "https://info.mzalendo.com/api/v0.1/hansard/entries/560192/?format=api",
    "text_counter": 17,
    "type": "other",
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    "content": "reservations on a Bill. The mechanism of a Joint Committee to consider a Presidential Memorandum on a Bill is a most important one. It is based on the recognition that the Presidential Memorandum comes at the end of a legislative process in which Parliament (by which to say both Houses of Parliament as a single entity) has considered and concluded the legislative process and agreed fully and in every respect on the version of the Bill that is to become law and has presented it to the President for assent. The President, in returning a Memorandum for reconsideration, is addressing Parliament on the outcome of its legislative process. Therefore, the two Houses, having previously concurred on the Bill, need to have opportunity to jointly consider the President’s reservations on their Bill. However, this does not take away the prerogative of each House to make a separate decision on the Presidential Memorandum. But such a decision must be informed by the views of the other partner to the process of making that Bill. This is particularly useful for legislative efficiency because the consideration of a Presidential Memorandum, unlike the consideration of a Bill, has no opportunity for mediation in a Mediation Committee. The Joint Committee, even though it has some similarities with a Mediation Committee, is not a Mediation Committee. Its only role is to enable both Houses to discuss the President’s reservations on a Bill and to see whether an agreed version on the President’s reservations can be arrived at. This is so only for the purpose of avoiding a situation where the Houses might have agreed on the manner in which to proceed on a Memorandum, if only each House had known what the other would propose. The Joint Committee’s role must also be understood in the context of Article 115 of the Constitution, which provides for such a high threshold for amendment of a Presidential Memorandum, that anything short of full agreement by both Houses leads to the President’s reservations prevailing over Parliament’s position. Unlike the Mediation Committee in which disagreement leads to the defeat of a Bill and technically allows the Houses another chance at fresh legislation, failure to agree on a Presidential Memorandum leads to the enactment of the Bill in a manner sought by the President despite any reservations that one or both of the Houses may have. The importance of seeking a collective parliamentary position at the outset cannot, therefore, be gainsaid. Hon. Senators, concerning the process of disposal of a report of a Joint Committee once laid in the Senate, I have noted that standing order 158(5) provides for a scenario where the President’s reservations shall be taken to have been approved by Parliament upon the laying of the report of a Joint Committee in the Senate. This is to occur where the report of the Joint Committee is to the effect that the Committee has failed to agree to the President’s reservations or where the Joint Committee fails to agree on a version of proposed amendments to the President’s reservations. While this may be aimed at ensuring the expeditious disposal of the Presidential Memorandum, I do not find that it accords with the Constitution which requires at Article 115 that Parliament as an entity, and each House specifically, pronounces itself on the Presidential Memorandum by- (a) amending the Bill in light of the President’s reservations; and, The electronic version of the Senate Hansard Report is for information purposes only. A certified version of this Report can be obtained from the Hansard Editor, Senate."
}