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{
    "id": 65337,
    "url": "https://info.mzalendo.com/api/v0.1/hansard/entries/65337/?format=api",
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    "content": "discretion in favour of allowing references to those matters. If the answer to (a) and (b) is in the negative, it will be necessary for the Speaker to exercise his discretion. Hon. Members, Standing Order No.80(3)(c) provides inter alia ; that civil proceedings shall be deemed to be active when arrangements for hearing such as setting down a case for trial have been made and until the proceedings are ended by judgement or discontinuance. In order to show that this provision is applicable, hon. Olago, as I indicated earlier, tabled a letter addressed to the Deputy Registrar of the High Court by Counsel for the respondent, requesting the Registrar to place the matter before the Judge for directions on a hearing date for the petition and suggests the 9th of February, 2011, if that date was convenient to the court. Hon. Members, a request for a hearing date is clearly not the same thing as setting down of a hearing date. It follows that as at when Mr. Olago sought to rely on the subjudice rule, a hearing date had not been set down. This requirement is important as it ensures that the House does not suspend business without proof that the matter will proceed on a known future date. For this reason, Mr. Olago did not establish that the proceedings were active. I, therefore, find and rule that on this score, the matter is not sub judice within the meaning of Standing Order No.80(3)(c). Hon. Members, as I have previously ruled, the sub judice rule is not one to be invoked lightly. A claim of a likelihood of prejudice of the fair determination of a matter is similarly not to be invoked without circumspection. I have ruled before and I reiterate that gagging this House and preventing it from discharging its constitutional mandate requires tangible reasons to be advanced. The danger of prejudice to the due administration of justice must be clearly shown. Speaker Snedden of the Australian House of Representatives held similar views when in 1976 he stated as thus: “There is the long line of authority from the courts which indicates that the courts and judges of the courts do not regard themselves as such delicate flowers, and they are likely to be prejudiced in their decisions by a debate that goes on in the House.” Hon. Members, even if it had been shown – which it was not – that the proceedings were active within the meaning of our rules, I am not prepared to find that in the present circumstances, there was or there is, a likelihood that the debate in this House would prejudice the fair determination of the matter. The ruling of the High Court was in fact rendered---"
}