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"id": 706506,
"url": "https://info.mzalendo.com/api/v0.1/hansard/entries/706506/?format=api",
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"type": "speech",
"speaker_name": "Hon. (Dr.) H.K. Njuguna",
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"speaker": {
"id": 1508,
"legal_name": "Humphrey Kimani Njuguna",
"slug": "humphrey-kimani-njuguna"
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"content": "Thank you, Hon. Speaker. I want to echo the feelings of Members who have spoken before me in supporting this Bill. The issue of contempt of court has been an enigma in this country. Many people have suffered perhaps because of lack of proper interpretation of what constitutes contempt of court. To the extent that this Bill attempts to define contempt of court, what instances one can be punished by the courts for it and the defence one can put up in the face of such proceedings, I support this Bill. I take note of Clause 3 of the Bill that tends to define the objects of the Bill. We basically live in a society where we uphold the rule of law. Upholding the rule of law will mean upholding the dignity and the authority of courts, compliance with the directions of the court, respect for the due process of court and maintaining confidence in the administration of justice. These are some of the objects the Bill puts forward as the principal objects that it seeks to promote. To that extent, I support the Bill because the whole concept of the rule of law is upholding order in society. If we cannot respect the court process or respect court orders, the rule of law will not prevail in such circumstances. Clause 3 tends to uphold the fact that we must uphold the rule of law at all times. If you go to Clause 4, it defines what contempt of court will constitute in this Bill. When one looks at Clause 4(a), contempt of court for civil matters will mean wilful disobedience. This is a situation where the court has given orders, direction or decree, but one chooses to wilfully disobey. That means you are doing it intentionally. In such cases, therefore, that is contempt. When one looks at Clause 4(b) on what constitutes criminal contempt, the Bill is very clear. In such cases, there must be publication in words spoken, written or signs. The key word here is publication. This is where one has done some publication. This is perhaps equivalent to what we call defamation. Clause 10 is about strict liability. In this Bill, strict liability is defined as where there is a publication. So, whether intentional or otherwise, you are strictly liable. The question of strict liability in criminal matters in terms of contempt is defined. Clause 9 is on defence to matters of contempt of court and it is very clear. It talks of fair comment. This is where, perhaps, you have commented fairly on matters before the court. We are giving a human face to the judicial process. This is where, perhaps, there is a matter before the court and you make a fair comment. So, Clause 9 defines what constitutes a fair comment in the judicial orders. In such a case, if you are accused of contempt of court, then you can bring out all those issues listed here under Clause 9 on what can constitute a fair comment. In the past, a lot of people have suffered before the court on what could be termed as fair comments. The Bill is clear because it allows you to make comments that will appear fair without being criticised. We must give the judicial process a human face such that people are allowed to make fair comments. If we are making fair comments on matters before Parliament or even the Executive, then the Judiciary should accept the fact that the same can apply to them. There are narratives of what would constitute a fair comment in this Bill and I find them credible. I have looked at Clause 10 which is on strict liability. I concur with Hon. Gichigi that when one is accused of strict liability, where whether you made your comments intentionally or otherwise, you are liable in law. There are also times when you could be accused of strict liability and yet it was not intentional. In such instances, should you suffer the same fate as those who made their comments intentionally? As Hon. Gichigi put it, in this case, one was not aware. In a case of strict liability, perhaps, there should be a lesser sentence. However, to the extent that this Bill demystifies the issue of contempt of court and goes ahead to define it, I support it. The electronic version of the Official Hansard Report is for information purposesonly. A certified version of this Report can be obtained from the Hansard Editor."
}