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    "id": 71824,
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    "content": "Order, hon. Members! My ruling draws a distinction which to my mind is crucial between those constitutional rights for which the procedure for vindication is specifically provided for in the Constitution and other constitutional rights whose procedure is not similarly ordained and which can be vindicated and addressed in a multiplicity of ways and by various state organs. The crux of my ruling is that where there is provision in the Constitution or the law specifically requiring that a document be produced in this House, the Speaker shall so rule and so require. However, where reliance for the document or information sought is on provisions of the Constitution, which themselves have inbuilt mechanisms for enforcement, those mechanisms must be allowed to operate. That distinction is important and hon. Members ought to follow that. Hon. Members, where the Constitution specifically recites a right of freedom and specifically provides for the manner, place and the functionary responsible for providing a relief when such right has been transgressed or is threatened with transgression, there is no place for the Speaker of the National Assembly or Senate for that matter or any other person, to usurp that mandate on the ground only that a constitutional right is at stake. Such usurpation will itself be a violation of the Constitution. In particular, I had made it clear in my ruling that the Bill of Rights, which is Chapter 4 of the Constitution, is clear at Articles 22 and 23 about how the rights contained in the Bill of Rights are to be enforced; and that it is in the authority of the courts to uphold and enforce the Bill of Rights. Hon. Members, in the circumstances, the closing words of my ruling must be understood in perspective. They mean no more than that whereas there is a province for the courts of law, Parliament is not left without recourse. The recourse available to Parliament has been enhanced rather than constrained by the new Constitution. All the traditional avenues through which information is sought from the Executive remain available and open to this House and to individual hon. Members. All that I have said in my ruling and which I reiterate is that this House and the Office of the Speaker are not substitutes for the jurisdiction of the courts clearly stipulated in Chapter Four of the Constitution. The courts remain available but so are the constitutional devices open to the Legislature. I trust this should lay this matter to rest. Hon. Members, on the point raised by the Member for Imenti Central on the status of the undertaking by the Assistant Minister to table these reports, I have found that this matter has already been disposed of by the Chair by a ruling delivered in this House on 29th July, 2009, which I invite Mr. Imanyara to revisit. In that ruling, the Chair, while expressing dissatisfaction that the Assistant Minister had been unable to honour his undertaking, determined that no interest would be served in holding the Minister to his word in a situation where it was not legally possible for him to fulfill the undertaking. The Chair, in that ruling, discharged Mr. Ojode from the undertaking and vacated previous orders requiring him to produce the reports and barring him from conducting the business of the House until the reports are produced. As matters, therefore, stand, there is"
}