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"content": "at acts of omission and commission by the Executive; they focus on policies. We cannot, and I repeat, we will not accept to be used by a mysterious Mr. Lagat to come out and paint the Executive or any particular person black. The story is very sad; it is a story of people believing that the auditors have been compromised, that KACC has been compromised, the Director, CID, has been compromised, the Ministry officials have been compromised; that everybody, except themselves and, perhaps, those who may be in heaven, has been compromised. We hoped to get the remotest evidence that, indeed, the Minister for Co-operative Development and Marketing receives Kshs200,000 on weekly basis as protection money. On a simple calculation that would work out to about Kshs800,000 per month; add to this Kshs7.2 million per month. We went flat out believing that Kshs1.2 billion was missing in the books. Even with the professionals who sit in the committee - I want to acknowledge one of them, a chartered accountant, hon. Akula - we could not understand how an audit report, if, indeed, Kshs1.2 billion Kshs1.5 billion was missing, could miss such a figure. The total figure entered was only Kshs13 billion. This would represent about 10 per cent of the amount, and any auditor would, surely, be able to pick such a figure. Mr. Temporary Deputy Speaker, Sir, our recommendations are; one, in respect to alleged concealed or destroyed vital files required by the banking fraud investigating unit, the committee received submissions from the Director of the KACC--- The committee wants to thank the Director, who came severally to the Committee. This was Mr. P.L.O Lumumba. The Director, Criminal Investigations Department ( CID), Mr. Muhoro, came in person with his officers. There are three crucial files; both of them confirmed to the committee that they were critical in sustaining any criminal or civil matter against the management, or, indeed, anybody; they contain:- (1) The cheque counter foils for the years 2003 to 2007; (2) Treasury registers for the years 2003 to 2007; and (3) The cashier’s daily specification report summary for the years 2003 to 2007 relating to cash transfers involving cashier 1 and a non-existent cashier No. 8. The committee could not, therefore, ascertain who bore responsibility for the disappearance of the documents. The committee, therefore, recommended specialized forensic audit to recover information relating to the missing files. We found it a bit strange that the police raided computers which we have in our possession; all the files and documents which are said to have been collected point to the three files. Although we recovered the guarantees for the software of the computers, none demonstrates that actually the software had been installed in the hardware that we received; this left a very big grey area in terms of investigations. Again there is the defunct Anti-Corruption Police Unit whom nobody knows who they were, or whether they, indeed. took any documents. There was a lot of recklessness on the part of the Harambee Sacco for not maintaining an inventory at the point when the documents were recovered. But we hear it was a raid in which 20 armed police officers moved in, took the computers, took any document and that was it."
}