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"content": "Mr. Temporary Deputy Speaker, Sir, we need those three critical sets of documents. Prof. Lumumba agrees that he needs those three critical documents. The Director, CID, has admitted that even with the manpower and whatever else he has, he cannot do that kind forensic audit. This leaves us with only the KACC to go back and see what they can do to try and reconstruct the data that would be contained in the three critical documents. According to Harambee Sacco Management, the documents are with the Director, CID. Again in this push and pull game we do not understand why, if the CID Director was, indeed, not responsible, he did not then charge these people with the lesser charge of concealing or hiding documents, or whatever charge that he would have preferred against them. Obviously, we, as a committee, in full execution of our oversight mandate recommend that:- (1) The Government strengthens the capacity of the CID and KACC. There are 12,000 plus Saccos. If this one case has taken us in a merry go round for the last two or three months, and has taken the Ministry of Co-operative Development and Marketing even longer and the police over four five years, that just shows that the police force we have and the Director of CID would require sympathy, funding and, maybe, prayers to do serious forensic audits. (2) As recommended by the Attorney General, the committee reiterates that a specialized audit be undertaken by KACC. Mr. Temporary Deputy Speaker, Sir, this House, if still interested, can invoke Standing Order 186 and hire a specialized auditor to try and reconstruct something bankable, or something that can sustain both a criminal and a civil case of this magnitude. In respect of alleged fraudulent encashment of cheques in the FOSA worth Kshs121 million only Kshs4,047,000 was actually found to have been misappropriated in that office. Subsequently action was taken against two employees, and we have named them in our report. The Sacco is now recovering the money from the two employees; the total amount involved is actually Kshs4,047,000 only and not Kshs121 million. The Committee also noted that the loss of money was as a result of weak internal controls in the Sacco; we underlined the “weak control systems in Sacco”. The Committee recommended that the internal audit be strengthened. Also the Government needs to build the capacities of the Saccos. These Saccos hold over Kshs200 billion. These Saccos are hiding over Kshs200 billion. These people sit with that money and the regulatory body, the Societies Regulatory Authority, cannot move. We need to have this Government come in heavily, so that we do not have these kinds of scenarios. Mr. Temporary Deputy Speaker, Sir, there are other Saccos, including some which are rural based, in places as far as Meru and Embu, about which we hear stories. There are other Saccos which are in this City. If we were to go this way, then this House and this Committee would spend all their time here questioning Saccos over issues to do with governance, because we do not have adequate regulatory mechanisms. In respect of allegations of the failure by the Central Management Committee (CMC) to implement the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission Report of 2004 and the Mwaliko Report, the Committee observed: This was corroborated by all the people who"
}