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{
    "id": 954515,
    "url": "https://info.mzalendo.com/api/v0.1/hansard/entries/954515/?format=api",
    "text_counter": 207,
    "type": "speech",
    "speaker_name": "Hon. Speaker",
    "speaker_title": "",
    "speaker": null,
    "content": "Standing Order 47(3) effectively excludes the participation of the House in the decision to be made by the Speaker and, as I have previously ruled, obliges the Speaker not to fold his or her arms and preside over deliberations that may lead to an unconstitutional and absurd result. Clauses 50 and 51 of the Finance Bill 2019 seek to amend the provisions of the Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2009 to designate advocates, among other professionals, as reporting institutions of any suspicious transactions done by their clients. I understand the concern of Hon. Murugara and all other lawyers in this House in trying to tie the attorney-client confidentiality, the right to privacy and the right of access to information under Articles 31 and 35 of the Constitution, respectively. However, as Members are aware, the Constitution is very clear on the rights and freedoms that may not be limited under any circumstances. Hon. Members, Article 25 of the Constitution provides as follows, and I quote: “25. Despite any provision in this Constitution, the following rights and fundamental freedoms shall not be limited— (a) freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; (b) freedom from slavery or servitude; (c) the right to a fair trial; and, (d) the right to an order of habeas corpus .” A clear reading of Article 25 of the Constitution mandates this House to limit any other right or fundamental freedom subject only to the protections outlined by the Constitution. Up to that point, and without interrogating the merits of the proposals, the argument that clauses 50 and 51 of the Finance Bill, 2019 ought to be excluded from consideration by this House on account of limiting constitutional rights seems not to hold any water in my view. Hon. Members, Article 24 of the Constitution prescribes the manner in which the rights and fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution may be limited. Clauses (1) and (2) of the Article are instructive insofar as they state, and I quote: “(1) A right or fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights shall not be limited except by law, and then only to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including— (a) the nature of the right or fundamental freedom; (b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; (c) the nature and extent of the limitation; (d) the need to ensure that the enjoyment of rights and fundamental freedoms by any individual does not prejudice the rights and fundamental freedoms of others; and, (e) the relation between the limitation and its purpose and whether there are less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. (2) Despite clause (1), a provision in legislation limiting a right or fundamental freedom— (a) in the case of a provision enacted or amended on or after the effective date, is not valid unless the legislation specifically expresses the intention to limit that right or fundamental freedom, and the nature and extent of the limitation; The electronic version of the Official Hansard Report is for information purposes only. Acertified version of this Report can be obtained from the Hansard Editor."
}