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{
    "id": 966663,
    "url": "https://info.mzalendo.com/api/v0.1/hansard/entries/966663/?format=api",
    "text_counter": 162,
    "type": "speech",
    "speaker_name": "The Deputy Speaker",
    "speaker_title": "",
    "speaker": null,
    "content": "that the deputy governor can then fill that gap and that is why there is a deputy in that county. However, nowhere has the learned judge said that the Governor of Samburu County should not henceforth perform his official functions. In fact, she emphasizes that the Governor is not being removed from office, meaning that no vacancy in the office of the governor has been created by the judgment; neither does the learned judge expressly pronounce herself that failure by the Governor to access the office by operation of the conditions in the order would constitute absence from office. Therefore, by operation of Article 179(5) of the Constitution, enable the Deputy Governor to act automatically. For those who have the view that such an order creates the absence of a governor, what the judge ought to have done was to declare the implications of the order to constitute absence within the meaning Article 179(5), which as I am going to see, will trigger the automatic acting of a status of the deputy governor. She does not say that this order creates an absence within the meaning of Article 179(5). She simply states that the governor may go to the county office with the permission and supervision of EACC. Should there be any practical challenges at any time in seeking or obtaining the permission for supervised access to the office, the deputy governor should be able to fill the gap by performing the functions and exercising the powers of the governor in an acting capacity. That is what she said. From the logic in the judgment, it is clear to me that the learned judge does not see the governor’s lack of access to the county office as constituting absence, as contemplated in Article 179(5) of the Constitution, to trigger the deputy governor’s right to be the acting governor automatically. If the judge’s intention was to apply and bring into effect Article 179(5), nothing would have been easier than to say so. A governor slapped with such a court order not to access the county office is in full compliance, by simply avoiding unauthorized and unsupervised access to the county government office. However, such a governor may make decisions from elsewhere, other than the office; sign documents from anywhere and hold meetings with County Executive Committee (CEC) Members from anywhere, so long as it is not in the county government office. They can hold meetings with other officials of the county government, visitors and citizens anywhere within the county, but outside the county government office. They can also inspect projects, co-ordinate, superintend or preside over events outside the office and so on, and so forth. He or she may make telephone calls, use social media accounts to communicate, correspond via electronic mails, ensure procurement, human resources and other critical departments are running well, on condition that he or she does not tamper with evidence touching on matters being investigated, or contact witnesses. Witnesses would have been disclosed anyway by the time of commencement of the governor’s criminal trial. Therefore, the order according to the learned judge neither creates a vacancy by removing the governor from office, nor does it deem the governor’s bar from accessing the county office to constitute an absence, therefore triggering the acting status of the deputy governor. To do so would run afoul of the constitutional principle of presumption of innocence. The electronic version of the Senate Hansard Report is for information purposesonly. A certified version of this Report can be obtained from the Hansard Editor, Senate."
}