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{
    "id": 966669,
    "url": "https://info.mzalendo.com/api/v0.1/hansard/entries/966669/?format=api",
    "text_counter": 168,
    "type": "speech",
    "speaker_name": "The Deputy Speaker",
    "speaker_title": "",
    "speaker": null,
    "content": "Particularly exempted from suspension – and for good reason – are Judges and Members of Independent Constitutional Commissions, who may be removed through tribunals established under the Constitution. This mechanism for removal using tribunals is not applied to so many state officers, including CSs. The tribunal route is one used on other state officers; and that does not create discrimination. Therefore, the distinction which is placed, whereby certain state or public officers cannot be suspended by being charged, is a distinction that is permissible. That is because it is reasonable, and it based on the functional environment under which the state or public officer works. Therefore, for a Judge or members of the Independent Commissions, if they are charged, that might even constitute a ground for their being removed through a tribunal. Now, the civil servants, like the CSs, Principal Secretaries (PSs) and ambassadors do not suffer the tribunal route. Does that mean that there is unconstitutionality there? No! Does it mean that there is discrimination there? No! Therefore, the reason, for example, Judges and members of Independent Commissions are exempted is because of the nature of functions they do. It is the same with elected leaders. Members of Parliament (MPs) and governors are elected leaders, and the way they can be removed from office is provided for. There are several ways for the removal of an MP. It can be through the operation of recall under Article 104; it can be through operation of Article 99(2)(h), where for example, they are removed under the disqualifications there. Thirdly, they can be removed by operation of Chapter Six. A state or public officer who contravenes Chapter Six, the consequence is removal from office. Therefore, because of those alternative mechanisms, Subsection 6 says that these people against whom there is a way of removing them, an alternative way should now be suspended, unlike the other civil servants and public officers who do not face similar consequences. Governors, for example, now that we are talking about them, are susceptible for removal under Article 181 through impeachment. If you look at the grounds of impeaching a governor, Article 181(1)(b), says:- “Where there are serious grounds to believe that the county governor has committed a crime under national or international law;” Simply put, if you ask me, being charged is a serious reason to believe. Therefore, this mechanism is available, and it not available to other public servants. My bigger problem, especially now that we are talking about governors, is because of our role as protectors and defenders of devolution. I consider allowing the suspension of elected leaders from office – in this case a governor – who are facing criminal charges susceptible to abuse. This is specially so whereby the criminal justice system may – I am not saying it has been misused, but there is potential for it being misused politically – have a political leader charged and removed from office. For Governors, I find suspending them a frontal attack on the distinct nature of county governments and their independence from the whims of the national Government. This is because the national Government exclusively somewhat controls the appointments to, funding and even, to some extent, operations of State investigative and prosecutorial agencies, thereby emasculating and weakening devolved governments. The electronic version of the Senate Hansard Report is for information purposesonly. A certified version of this Report can be obtained from the Hansard Editor, Senate."
}