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{
    "id": 969635,
    "url": "https://info.mzalendo.com/api/v0.1/hansard/entries/969635/?format=api",
    "text_counter": 177,
    "type": "speech",
    "speaker_name": "Mr. Charles Njenga",
    "speaker_title": "",
    "speaker": null,
    "content": "Mr. Speaker, Sir, I only have one point then His Excellency the Governor will address the Senate. My only response in summing up is the question of time. There has been a submission that under the Standing Orders of this House, this House can circumvent the operation of statutes. The suggestion is the Standing Orders rank higher in profile of application than the County Governments Act with regard to timelines. Far from it, it is only called sophistry, a very good argument – impressionable, but legally dishonest. The County Governments Act does not provide any digression for the extension of time. It is very different with, for example, the Civil Procedure Act. Within itself, it says that the court can extend time on certain circumstances and then the rules at Order No.49 provide for those circumstances. That similar provision is not available in the County Governments Act. We need to be honest in our submissions, much as we want to quickly dispatch Gov. Waititu from his position. Mr. Speaker, Sir, another better analogy would be the Elections Act. The courts have said that the courts have no discretion to extend time even for a day in the matter of elections. In fact, the Supreme Court said in Raila Odinga Petition No. 1 that even if a tonne of evidence was to be availed on the eighth day, that petition would not be admissible because Article 40 says that seven days from declaration of elections. Section 33 says seven days after the speaker of the county assembly transmits to the Speaker of the Senate which was 23rd December, 2019. So, under which provision are we saying the Standing Orders extent to in the matter of extending time? There is no provision. The proper reading of the law, and I am glad many speakers have adverted to the fact that the House has many senior lawyers, more senior than me; the proper reading of this particular statute shows that there is no discretion to extend time. In the Limitation of Actions Act, if you look at Section 27, it gives a leeway. It says that the court can in these circumstances. Those are distinguishable statutes from the County Governments Act. Mr. Speaker, Sir, the other issue that was raised was public participation. It was alleged that we did not contest. We filed a preliminary objection contesting that as an issue of law and fact. Once you plead not guilty in the proceedings of this nature which are quasi-judicial and quasi-criminal, then all the material issues become issues that should be evidenced by the alleger. The person alleging is the County Assembly. So, they should have demonstrated as provided in the Standing Orders that before they brought this resolution there was a process as constitutionally provided for public participation. On the question of the standard of proof of occurrence of a serious likelihood that a governor has committed a crime in the contemplation of Article 181, the Senate has ruled consistently that it will be opening a pandora’s box to make that an impeachment issue based on mere allegations. The Senate has said on that Article then you will need to show us a conviction. Mr. Speaker, Sir, on the question of additional evidence, there has been a splitting of hairs of semantics of allegations and evidence. Allegations can only be made by way of evidence. So, a case against a governor should not mutate, should not change in the nature and manner in the weight of evidence from the county assembly all the way to the Senate. The electronic version of the Senate Hansard Report is for information purposesonly. A certified version of this Report can be obtained from the Hansard Editor, Senate."
}